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Abstract 
In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration established the Arctic Council (AC) with eight states, all of 
which have territory in the Arctic. The AC is the leading intergovernmental forum in terms of 
sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. This forum promotes 
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States and among Arctic 
indigenous communities. The Netherlands became an Observer in 1998, whereas China 
joined the AC in 2013. Both states are concerned about the impact of climate change in the 
Arctic region and the different kinds of consequences it may have for their state. Both states 
contribute to the AC with scientific knowledge, and they participate in several Working 
Groups. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) helps explore and understand the meaning of the 
role of the Netherlands and China as Observers, leading to an answer to how both states use 
science diplomacy (SD) as a strategic tool and potentially revealing hidden agendas in terms 
of the nature of their economic interest. Although CDA did not unfold hidden agendas of both 
states, what can be said is that probably both states are using SD as a strategic tool to shift 
attention away from their own (economic) incentives.  
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1. Introduction 
Climate change caused by human activity is one of the biggest threats to life on Earth at the 
moment and is a salient issue on the policy agenda worldwide (Hodson 2017, 53). In 2015, 
the Paris climate agreement was signed by 194 countries. The overall goal of this agreement 
is to hold global temperatures well below two degrees Celsius and to pursue efforts to limit 
the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Celsius (Climate Focus 2015). “The agreement aims 
to increase the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, and at making 
finance flows consistent with a low GHG emissions and climate-resilient pathway” 
(UNFCCC 2015). Although 193 countries strive for “well below two degrees”, many 
scientists are frustrated at the slow pace of action on climate change from some political 
leaders (Hodson 2015, 53). Global warming leads to pervasive and irreversible impacts such 
as dangerous heat, water scarcity, ocean warming, more frequent storms, and hurricanes that 
are stronger and last longer. One of the major challenges is that global warming has 
accelerated the melting of ice in the Arctic region (The State Council Information Office 
2018, 3). 
While the ice caps at the North Pole have not completely melted yet, various states are 
already concerned about the energy resources and waterways that are becoming accessible. 
Security and geopolitical issues in this region are becoming more important nowadays. In 
1996, the Ottawa Declaration established the Arctic Council (AC) with eight states, all of 
which have territory in the Arctic. The AC is the leading intergovernmental forum in terms of 
sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic. This forum promotes 
cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous 
communities (Chater 2015, 538; The Arctic Council 2015a). Written in the Ottawa 
Declaration is that Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Kingdom of Denmark, the United 
States, and the Russian Federation are permanent Member States of the Arctic Council. In 
addition, six organizations representing Arctic indigenous peoples have the status of 
Permanent Participants (ibid.). Arctic Council Observers contribute through their engagement 
in the Council at the level of Working Groups. Observer status is open to non-Arctic states 
and to global and regional non-governmental organizations.
1
 Both the Netherlands and 
People's Republic of China (hereafter China) have a role as Observer.  
The AC has ministerial meetings every two years with ministers of foreign affairs, and 
it has a senior Arctic officials’ meeting twice a year (Chater 2015, 538). However, most of the 
                                                 
1 See members Arctic Council appendix 1. 
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work is carried out by six Working Groups, and they meet separately. Dutch polar researchers 
participate in three of them, namely AMAP, CAFF and SDWG (Splinter 2016, 2). The 
acronym AMAP stands for Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program. This group monitors 
the Arctic environment, ecosystems, and human populations, providing scientific advice to 
support governments as they tackle pollution and the adverse effects of climate change (The 
Arctic Council 2015a). The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Working Group (CAFF) 
address the conversation of Arctic biodiversity, working to ensure the sustainability of the 
Arctic’s living resources (ibid.). The latter, SDWG, is the Sustainable Development Working 
Group, which works to advance sustainable development in the Arctic and to improve the 
conditions of Arctic communities as a whole (ibid.). Chinese researchers participate in three 
Working Groups: AMAP, CAFF, and PAME (Xiaoning 2016, 2); the latter stands for 
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment. In addition, China has attended the Scientific 
Cooperation Task Force (SCTF).   
When the AC was founded in 1996, military security governance of the region was 
excluded from the mandate, which means that the Council was a limited environmental 
organization (Chater 2014, 542). Today, due to accelerated melting of the region, security and 
geopolitical issues are becoming more important. For example, territorial claims were made 
by the Russian Federation (hereafter Russia; Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2016, 16), 
and states such as China, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India are interested in northern 
shipping routes and oil and gas exploitation. The United Nations Convention on the Law of 
Sea 1994 (UNCLOS) allowed states to extend their exclusive economic zones. This resulted 
in the exploitation of resources. The AC today faces serious challenges and issues, such as 
expanding its mandate and addressing military security and economic issues. According to 
Chater, The Council should continue to develop treaties instead of producing reports with 
policy recommendations (2014, 541). There is a fear that additional Observer states and 
organizations will challenge the power of the Permanent Participants (ibid.).  
Science diplomacy (SD), which, according Lópex de San Román and Schunz, is 
threefold: informing policy objectives with scientific advice, facilitating international science 
cooperation, and using science cooperation to improve international relations (2018, 247). 
Hundreds of scientists are coming together to gather knowledge about the Arctic region. This 
knowledge can be used in the Working Groups of the AC or to exploit resources. One 
example of SD is that since mid-October 2019, the Polarstern research vessel has been frozen 
in the north of Siberia. The ship is equipped with the most advanced technology so as to 
gather knowledge about the climate in the Arctic. Hundreds of meteorologists, biologists, 
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oceanographers, physicists, and chemists on this vessel from 19 countries, including the 
Netherlands, conduct research into the ocean, atmosphere, and sea ice. Their measurements 
and analyses should teach us more about the consequences of climate change and improve 
climate models (Speksneijder 2019). Science cooperation is required on the Polarstern to 
improve international relations among states, researchers, and universities. All the knowledge 
gathered during this expedition will be used to inform the policy objectives of the AC. 
Regarding China’s involvement in the Arctic, China had its first polar voyage in 2018. 
This was coordinated by the Ministry of Natural Resources’ First Institute of Oceanography 
(FIO). The expedition was to install and service an expanding network of monitoring devices 
across the Arctic (Eiterjord 2019). This was only one initiative of many in 2018. China calls 
itself a “near-Arctic state” and, with its growing role as a major stakeholder, also opened the 
China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in northern Iceland. The aim of this research 
station is to conduct research into glaciology, oceanography, and other fields (ibid.). This type 
of research can be traced back to SD as well, as it is a joint research initiative between Iceland 
and China. Regarding shipping, China launched its first polar icebreaker, named Xuelong 2 
(Gady 2018). This “Snow Dragon” will “boost China’s polar research and expedition 
capabilities” (ibid.). In 2018, China took big steps to make its presence visible in the Arctic 
region and thus AC. 
The Netherlands and China both participate in Working Groups in the AC and carry 
out different research projects. Both states are using SD to improve international relations, 
informing policy objectives with scientific advice and facilitating international science 
cooperation. It may be the case that they do so in pursuit of their own economic interests. For 
example, China is building the Polar Silk Road, which can lead to political implications and 
fragmentation on global level, since China is a rising economic power (Pelaudeix 2018, 7). 
Regarding the Netherlands, approximately ten percent of the activities of the Dutch maritime 
sector are currently related to the Arctic and the turnover generated by these activities 
amounts to several billion euros (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2016, 21). The 
Netherlands and China could shift the attention away from their own incentives by using SD 
as a strategy. The following reasons may justify the selection of the Netherlands and China as 
Observer states in my research, and not France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, India, Korea, 
Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, or the United Kingdom (The Arctic Council 2015b). First, 
China’s interest in developing a strategic infrastructure may pose a challenge to the 
environmental and social standards upheld by the EU and other parties and states (Pelaudeix 
2018, 1). Second, China tries to secure resources such as oil, gas, and minerals. Third, various 
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actors are concerned that China will project military power in the Arctic (ibid.). In addition, 
China is building the Polar Silk Road, as mentioned above. Not only the Netherlands but also 
the United States (US) are concerned about the participation of China in the Arctic region, 
due to the various implications it has.   
It is interesting to examine the Netherlands as an Observer because the Dutch 
government believes that both a strong international legal order and active cooperation in 
relevant forums contribute to transparency. This legal order will help to ensure that the 
activities of all Arctic actors, including China, contribute to peaceful and sustainable 
development in the interest of all (Blok 2019, 7). However, the Netherlands has no direct 
control in the Arctic region and wants be as close to the international decision-making process 
as China. The Netherlands justifies its interest in the Arctic in international terms, whereas 
China does it in national terms. It is interesting to compare the Netherlands which is a 
relatively small country and relies on the European Union (EU) and international agreements, 
and justifies its interest in the Arctic in international terms, whereas China is a rising 
economic power and does it in national terms. 
The Netherlands see the Arctic region and Antarctica as “global public goods.” These 
areas have a unique value for humanity and for the global ecosystems and are therefore not 
merely a matter for the states in these regions. Vulnerable ecosystems are strongly affected by 
climate change (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2016, 4). Global warming leads to the 
loss of ice and puts biodiversity in these areas under pressure. This has indirect and direct 
implications for the Netherlands; for example, the sea level rises due to melting ice caps, and 
more extreme weather patterns worldwide can result in conflicts and political instability, 
changes in biodiversity, new economic opportunities, and changing geopolitical relationships 
(ibid.).  
China identifies itself as a “near-Arctic state” in its first white paper on Arctic policy, 
which was published on 26 January 2018, because it is geographically close to the Artic (The 
State Council Information Office 2018, 3). China emphasizes that “the natural conditions of 
the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system and ecological 
environment, and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine 
industry and other sectors” (ibid). China seeks to justify its AC ambitions through scientific 
research, but for the first time, China acknowledges that its interests extend to a variety of 
commercial activities (Grieger 2018, 1). Due to various implications these commercial 
activities have on global level, the Netherlands is concerned about these developments which 
can result in indirect and direct effects on them. China wants to build a “Polar Silk Road” that 
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connects China with Europe via the Arctic. China articulates via the white paper its policy 
goals as being to understand, protect, develop, and participate in the governance of the Arctic 
and to build a future for mankind (State Council Information Office 2018, 4). China strives 
for respect, cooperation, and win-win results. Respect, according to China, is meant to be 
reciprocal. China respects sovereignty and the rights of other Arctic States, but these states 
should respect “the right and freedom of non-Arctic states to carry out activities in this 
region” (ibid). It may be that China’s claims in this respect are not true to its actual agenda, 
since China has acknowledged its economic incentives. 
Both states are concerned about the impact of climate change in the Arctic region and 
the different kinds of consequences it may have for their state. The Netherlands and China 
both agree that the melting of the Arctic influences economic activities, the geopolitical 
situation, and international relations and that it affects climate, nature, and the environment 
and its biodiversity. Both states contribute to the AC with scientific knowledge, and they 
participate in several Working Groups. It is interesting to investigate what they hope to 
achieve through their participation in the AC. The aim of this thesis is to discover whether the 
Netherlands and China are trying to shift attention away from their own incentives by using 
SD as a strategy. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) helps unfold the hidden agendas of both 
states, meaning an agenda which is known by the government but kept secret from other 
actors. The following question is answered in this research: 
 
What does the science diplomacy of the Netherlands and the People’s Republic of 
China as Observer States in the Arctic Council reveal about the nature of their 
economic interests?  
 
Given the fact that the Netherlands and China are deeply involved in the AC, SD could be 
used as a strategy to cover hidden agendas to accomplish their economic incentives. 
Conducting academic research into this topic can lead to interesting results. Both countries 
claim to be concerned about the environmental impact of Artic melting, but it is unclear 
exactly why both states are contributing scientific knowledge within the AC. By using CDA 
and looking at how the Netherlands and China use SD as a strategy, I hope to make clear 
whether both countries have a hidden agenda. If so, it will raise awareness and knowledge 
that can be used in the policies of the AC and others. This can lead to better outcomes and 
perspectives regarding the AC.  
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 After this introduction, the theoretical framework follows. Key concepts, such as 
diplomacy and science diplomacy, are defined. Next, a discussion of critical scholars’ ideas 
and concepts follows, which leads to useful tools for conducting CDA later in this thesis. This 
information brings us to a suitable research design. This design is specified, as is CDA as a 
method, in the chapter on methodology. In addition, the data collection is justified, and some 
limitations of this research are addressed. In the sections outlined above, the stage has been 
set for the analysis. CDA will be applied to the policy of the Netherlands and to the white 
paper of China. This leads to an answer, in the conclusion, to the research question. Finally, 
some suggestions are made for further research into the topic of the AC. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Diplomacy can be understood as an instrument of foreign policy. Talking to other people is 
one way of getting what you want (Constantinou and Sharp 2016, 17). Diplomacy contributes 
to making things happen in international relations or to understanding why they happened as 
they did (7). Diplomats provide information concerning developments in both their home 
country and their host country (Gonesh and Melissen 2005, 3). “The basic principles of 
diplomacy as the basis for negotiations between states have an enduring validity” (Sofer 
1988, 195). However, Der Derian, a critical scholar, argues that seeing diplomacy only as “an 
exchange of accredited envoys” leads to a conservative preference for the status quo in 
international politics (1987, 91). Diplomatic theory is required to understand the relationship 
between power and diplomacy through discursive and cultural practices (92). Therefore, he 
emphasizes the importance of analyzing the role of power for understanding diplomacy 
(ibid.), although power alone is not enough to explain the conduct of diplomacy; beliefs and 
opinions need to be examined as well. According to critical scholars who have studied 
diplomacy, “the desire to control diplomatic discourse, to determine its truth, origins, and 
transformations becomes more urgent” (Der Derian, 1987; Constantinou, 1996; Cornago, 
2013 as cited in Opondo 2019, 7). This desire to control diplomatic discourse in relation to 
the basic principles of diplomacy means that the analysis of the role of power becomes more 
important for understanding diplomacy (Der Derian 1987, 92). Der Derian defines the nature 
of diplomacy as “mediation between estranged individuals, groups, or entities, which will be 
defended and become more specific in due course” (93). Mainstream perspectives on 
diplomacy take the definition of diplomacy as given, without questioning this assumption 
(Constantinou and Sharp 2016, 21). Critical perspectives on diplomacy draw attention to the 
problems with making such an assumption and seek to expose ethical and power implications, 
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exploring the marginalizations, hierarchies, exclusions, and alienations that these practices 
produce (22). Moreover, “diplomacy employs wealth and power to achieve ends, but it is also 
[…] a site for the deployment of truth claims and identity games, that is, a site for exercising 
knowledge as power and power as knowledge” (ibid.). A critical perspective on diplomacy 
helps to explore the relation between power and knowledge. The end of the Cold War, 9/11, 
and the rapidly growing Asian economies marked the beginning of questioning power 
relations within the international system (Gonesh and Melissen 2005, 3). 
Diplomacy is a form of soft power, a term introduced by Joseph Nye. In his view, 
unlike hard power, soft power “describes the ability to attract and co-opt rather than coerce, 
use force, or give money as a means of persuasion” (Lovric 2016, 30). There are three main 
sources of soft power: political values, foreign policy, and culture (31). Soft power 
supposedly achieves its goals through persuasion that one’s views on the situation are 
attractive (ibid.).  
 There are different types of diplomatic engagement, for example, public diplomacy, 
digital diplomacy and, sports diplomacy. Public diplomacy is an instrument for strategic 
policy communications that enables the state to strengthen its image through engagement, 
dialogue, and mutuality with governmental and non-governmental actors (Gonesh and 
Melissen 2005, 3-4). Digital diplomacy, according to Rashica, “is characterized by the great 
influence on the realization of diplomatic practices, providing an influential space for ICT, the 
internet, and social media, which are at the same time its core elements” (2018, 75-76). In 
other words, this means that “more people in more places” have access to the information, 
social media, and websites of Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFAs) and embassies. Social 
media provide a platform for transparent communication (77). Another type of diplomatic 
engagement is sports diplomacy. Sports can serve as a tool to influence diplomatic interests 
through international sports events (Chan and Brooke 2019, 2162). For example, in 1997 and 
2000, a series of golf games took place between Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong 
and US president Bill Clinton. These games led to the initiation of US-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement (2161). Chan and Brooke argue that these games created an environment that 
allowed the political leaders to relax and discuss issues in private (ibid.). Sports events create 
diplomatic opportunities to cool tensions between states or assess the ground for potential 
policy changes (2162). In addition, “sports as a diplomatic tool benefits government by 
allowing traditional diplomatic institutions to make exchanges without going through open 
conflict and the potential creation of an anarchical environment” (ibid.).  
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All of the diplomatic tools within, for instance, economic diplomacy, sports 
diplomacy, or public diplomacy are applicable to SD because it rests on the basis for 
negotiations enduring validity between states. However, taking a critical stance means that 
questioning assumptions is important. Science collaborations can create diplomatic 
opportunities for states and potential policy changes. What a critical perspective would reveal 
in discussions of SD is that diplomacy helps constitute international narratives, but CD would 
reveal their gaps, concealments, and contradictions (Der Derian 2012 as cited in Constantinou 
and Sharp 2016, 22). It would be interesting to examine these gaps and contradictions. 
 A more in-depth exploration of the definition of SD is necessary to fully understand 
how the Netherlands and China use it as a strategic tool. As Copeland puts it, “Science is 
widely perceived as complex and impenetrable. Diplomacy is often viewed as elitist and 
ineffective” (2016, 629). Nevertheless, SD is important and becoming more so in times of 
globalization (ibid.): “SD can be best understood as a diplomatic technique by which S&T 
[science and technology] knowledge is freed from its rigid national and institutional 
enclosures, thereby releasing its potential to address directly the drivers of underdevelopment 
and insecurity” (ibid). The significance of this definition is that S&T knowledge can be 
exchanged without open conflict.  
The phrase SD is presented as consisting of three areas. However, SD is mostly used 
as a whole term, and a consensus on its definition has yet to be forged (ibid.). Both Pelaudeix 
and Lópex de San Román and Schunz have distinguished the same three dimensions of SD as 
defined by the Royal Society (2018, 4; 2018, 247): science in diplomacy (informing policy 
objectives with scientific advice); diplomacy for science (facilitating international science 
cooperation); and science for diplomacy (using science cooperation to improve international 
relations between countries, regions, or organizations). The latter dimension indicates the use 
of science in foreign policy contexts as “an effective agent to manage conflicts, improve 
global understanding, lay grounds for mutual respect and contribute to capacity-building” 
(Flink and Schreiterer 2010, 665 as cited in Lópex de San Román and Schunz 2018, 247). 
Science diplomacy combines political agency with the scientific method of knowledge 
production and is a generator of soft power (Copeland 2016, 630). One of the differences 
between international science cooperation and SD is that the latter involves state interests. 
These interests can diverge, which means that the outcomes may be asymmetrical (Copeland 
2016, 631). Another important point is that states do not possess the same level of SD 
capacity. For example, the Netherlands and China do not contribute the same way either 
financially or scientifically. Between 2016 and 2020, China spent yearly 60 million US 
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dollars on scientific research in the Arctic, whereas the Netherlands spent yearly 4.1 million 
euros (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal 2016, 17 & 6). In addition, SD may also give rise 
to insecurity and underdevelopment (Copeland 2016, 632). Both S&T and SD can lead to 
better outcomes, but they are also present on “the dark side”: They are capable of generating 
environmental devastation and nuclear weapons, and thus war (631).  
Currently, SD is becoming more important. Although S&T and innovation are 
associated with globalization and central to all dimensions of our lives—according to 
Copeland, the abundance of information is changing everything (2016, 235)—there is little 
attention paid to SD. Global issues such as climate change, cyberspace, biotechnology, and 
big-data leaks cannot be solved using military force. It is therefore important to strengthen SD 
as a soft power, because it can be used to solve problems such as reducing inequality, 
resolving differences, and advancing security (ibid.).  
To clarify how power relations have been perpetuated through the policy papers of the 
Netherlands and China, a closer look at the work of Michel Foucault is required. He was a 
French philosopher and created an approach to study discourse, Foucauldian discourse 
analysis (FDA), which belongs to poststructuralist thought (Sutherland et al. 2016, 388). 
CDA, including FDA, offers tools to understand the link between discourse and social 
structure. Discourse refers to “a group of statements that structure the way a thing is thought, 
and the way we act on basis of that thinking” (Rose 2016, 187). According to Johnstone, our 
worldview is related to what we talk about and how we talk about it (2008, 73). As she puts it, 
we think of the world as natural and independent of language. But discourse shapes the 
phenomenal (experienced) world in turn as people bring worlds into being by talking (ibid.). 
In other words, our worldview is dependent on language. CDA needs to be concerned with 
discourse both as the instrument of power and control and as the instrument of the social 
construction of reality (Wodak 2001, 9). CDA aims to critically investigate social inequalities 
embedded in language use and discourse (2). Language is not powerful on its own; it gains 
power by the powerful people who use it (ibid.).  
According to Foucault, power generates knowledge, and this knowledge gives power 
over people (Akdağ and Swanson 2018, 69). The relationship between power and knowledge 
is “fluid, inextricable, and complex” (ibid.). This relationship reflects two sides of a single 
process, and one cannot be seen without the other (Garratt 1998, 223). Power and knowledge 
directly imply one another, which means that knowledge does not reflect power relations but 
is embedded in it (224). Therefore, knowledge is an exercise of power, and power is a 
function of knowledge. Power can be in play within any relation or institution (ibid.). One 
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important aspect of understanding the power relationship is the concept of “regime of truth.” 
In the words of Foucault, “Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: 
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault 1980, 
131 as cited in Garratt 1998, 225). Garratt understands a regime of truth “to convey the 
connection between the concepts of power-knowledge which is produced by, and produces, a 
specific art of government” (Gore 1993, 55 as cited in Garratt 1998, 225). It refers to context, 
or the field that is producing this “truth,” which is presented as the only truth. 
Power relationships are expressed through language, identities, practices, and the 
relationship between knowledge and power (71). The study of discourse is more than a study 
of language; it must also account for the social context and social relationships within which 
power and knowledge are distributed (Carrabine 2001, 28 as cited in Akdağ and Swanson 
2018, 71). A few other key notions of Foucault’s must be pointed out in terms of CDA. 
Power, power-knowledge, regime of truth, and discourse have been discussed. Other key 
notions are governmentality, discursive practice, and resistance to power. Foucault defines 
governmentality as “governing the self to govern others,” which means “that power and 
domination serve different purposes within modern society, with governments relying on 
various technologies to implement their policies in order to exercise power” (Lanlehin 2018, 
127). As Lanlehin puts it, policies are a reflection of governmentality where power is 
involved (ibid.). To govern means to structure the field of action of others, where individuals 
are directed by the techniques of the government and which in turn assimilate power and 
knowledge via technologies of the self. Technologies of the self can be defined as the 
relationship an individual has with him- or herself (Garratt 1998, 224). Discursive practice 
links power-knowledge relations to discourse. Fairclough defines discursive practice as the 
production, distribution, and consumption of texts (1992 as cited in Bacchi and Bonham 
2014, 174). Discursive practice describes the practices of knowledge formation, focusing on 
how this specific knowledge or discourse operates (ibid.). In Foucault’s words, “Where there 
is power, there is resistance” (1998, 95), meaning that there is always a sense of being 
oppressed by the one who holds the power. These key notions of Foucault’s help to make 
sense of the complex situation of the AC.   
In the following, the importance of speech acts is discussed. Ideological 
representations of subjects and their relationships are embodied in the conventions for speech 
acts which form part of a discourse type (Fairclough 2001b, 131). As Ni and Kui put it, there 
are two types of strategies when using speech acts: direct and indirect (2011, 376). Direct 
speech acts are sentences that use modal verbs to establish power in an explicit and direct 
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manner. These direct speech acts contain a direct relationship between the structure and 
function of an utterance. These direct speech acts impose a high degree of legal force. An 
indirect speech act strategy relies on the socio-linguistic, political, and legal context of the 
utterance, which is based on the discourse (ibid.). 
 Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso, who emphasize the importance of speech acts, have 
developed specific claims to define an ontological shift in thinking about the Chinese Silk 
Road. One of them is that language use is a form of measurement that shapes and transforms 
reality (2018, 194). Speech acts evoke a set of meanings, and they explore the historical 
context of such an act (2018, 196). With regard to, for example, China’s intention to build 
peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation (198), this approach forces us to look at 
concepts such mutual benefit, win-win, and mutual construction. These concepts are 
consistent with Chinese foreign policy discourse as quoted below (ibid.).  
 
China has managed to balance its ambitions with a largely peaceful and cooperative 
foreign policy, as defined by its own discourse. This grants legitimacy to the new Silk 
Roads, although there is no question that the sheer scale of China’s objectives raises 
questions about its intentions, i.e. regional/global hegemony (Dobra-Manço 2015, as 
cited in Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso 2018, 198). 
 
Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso offer an interesting tool to conduct research into the discourse of 
the AC. On the one hand, attention must be paid to concepts such as “win-win and mutual 
respect.” On the other hand, questions about China’s intentions needs to be taken into 
account. In sum, diplomacy and thus SD are a form of soft power. An analysis of power is 
necessary to understand SD; CDA, including FDA, offers tools to understand the link 
between discourse and social structure. Power relationships are expressed through language, 
identities, practices, and the relationship between knowledge and power. Fairclough, Ni and 
Kui, and Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso emphasize the importance of speech acts. Attention 
needs to be paid to concepts such as “win-win and mutual respect” and questions about the 
intentions of the Netherlands and China.  
 
3. Critical Discourse Analysis 
In this chapter, CDA as a method is explained. First, ideas and concepts of existing critical 
scholars are discussed. These ideas and concepts, together with useful tools and steps for 
conducting CDA, are woven into a suitable research design. In addition, the data collection is 
justified, and some limitations of this research are addressed. CDA is a theoretical perspective 
on language and, more generally, semiosis as one element or moment of the material social 
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process. This perspective gives rise to ways of analyzing language or semiosis within broader 
analyses of the social process (Fairclough 2001a, 121). In other words, CDA is a 
multidisciplinary theory or method and should engage with other theories and methods. 
 Fairclough defines discourse as “language as a form of social practice” that should be 
approached by looking at what differentiates discourse from text, and Wodak was inspired by 
his work (2001b, 16 & 2). Fairclough based a part of his work on Foucault, who ascribed a 
central role to discourse in the development of specifically modern forms of power (10). A 
written text is a product of the process of text production (20). Texts consist of member 
resources, which are in people’s heads and are “draw[n] upon when [people] produce or 
interpret texts—including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and 
social world they inhabit, values, beliefs, and assumptions” (ibid.). These member resources 
are involved in an interplay with the process of production and the process of interpretation. 
In other words, discourse is based on the whole process of social interaction, of which a text 
is just a part (ibid.). Member resources are socially generated, which gives them the force to 
shape societies. Seeing language as a social practice means analyzing the relationship 
between texts, interactions, and contexts.
 2
 Van Dijk, a linguist who made practical guidelines 
for CDA, also emphasizes the importance of a text:  
 
CDA always needs to account for at least some of the detailed structures, strategies 
and functions of text and talk, including grammatical, pragmatic, interactional, 
stylistic, rhetorical, semiotic, narrative or similar forms of verbal and paraverbal 
organization of communicative events (Van Dijk 2001, 97). 
 
In sum, CDA needs to account for a text to explore the discourse. What Fairclough, Wodak, 
and Van Dijk have in common is that they are all aware of the power relations within a 
discourse and see discourse as language as a form of social practice. Fairclough emphasizes 
connections between language use and unequal relations of power (2001b, 1). Inspired by 
Foucault, he strives to explain existing conventions as the outcome of power relations and 
power struggles (1-2). Wodak considers the context of language use to be crucial as well, 
especially the relation between language and power (2001, 1). Fairclough unpacks “common-
sense” assumptions implicit in the conventions by which people interact linguistically and of 
which people are not aware (2001b, 2). Van Dijk stresses the importance of power abuse and 
domination (2001, 96). He defines CDA as discourse analysis with “an attitude,” which 
focuses on social problems, especially on the role of discourse in the production and 
                                                 
2 See Figure 1 appendix 2. 
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reproduction of power abuse and domination (ibid.). Common-sense assumptions need be 
unfolded to make power relations visible. These power relations can be linked to Foucauldian 
concepts because power relationships are expressed through language, identities, practices, 
and the relationship between knowledge and power. Another key point that is that CDA is 
considered critical because it makes the interconnectedness of things visible (Wodak 2001, 2); 
from this perspective, there is no neutral language, and common-sense assumptions need to be 
unfolded. In addition, Van Dijk argues that he does not want to be followed in his approach, 
otherwise CDA would lack a critical attitude (2001, 95). This means that every CDA study 
needs its own approach. 
 CDA examines macro notions such as power and domination. However, to understand 
macro notions, study take place at the micro level of discourse and social practices (Van Dijk 
2001, 115). The choice of discourse categories is essential in CDA. For example, for 
discursive, cognitive, and social reasons, the topics of discourse play a significant role in 
communication and interaction (101). Because CDA treats power, domination, and social 
inequality, it tends to focus on groups, organizations, and institutions. This sort of analysis 
needs to account for the various forms of social cognition, namely knowledge, attitudes, 
ideologies, norms, and values, that are shared by these collectivities (113). There are forms in 
which knowledge or attitude items are expressed directly, for instance, propaganda. Indirect 
forms express socially shared representations through mental models. Bottom-up and top-
down linkages of discourse and interaction with societal structures are felt to be the crux of 
CDA (118-119). Fairclough also stresses the importance of the relationship between language 
on the micro level and the social process on the macro level (2001a, 121). Therefore, an 
explicit elaboration at the micro level is required to understand the meaning of the macro 
level. 
 In order answer the research question, a qualitative approach is needed. I repeat the 
research question for the sake of convenience: What does the science diplomacy of the 
Netherlands and the People’s Republic of China as Observer states in the AC reveal about the 
nature of their economic interests? This approach helps to explore and understand the 
meaning of the role of the Netherlands and China as Observers. The process of research 
involves answering emerging questions, collecting data, and interpreting the collected data 
(Creswell 2014, 4). This is a purely a qualitative analysis in its approach, analyzing policy 
papers and official documents released by the AC and MFAs of the Netherlands and China.  
 To execute this research, I use primary and secondary resources. The primary 
resources are the “Dutch Polar Strategy 2016–2020,” published by the Dutch government in 
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2016, and the “Kamerbrief actualisering veiligheidsdeel Polaire Strategie.”3 I include the 
latter because it updates the strategy of the Netherlands. For China, I use the white paper 
“China’s Artic Policy,” which was issued by the State Council Information Office in 2018. 
Other documents analyzed in the following are “China to further active engagement in Arctic 
affairs,” “Beijing aspires to bigger Arctic role,” “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation released at 16th China-EU Summit,” and “China ready to enhance Arctic 
environmental cooperation.” These are all relatively short documentations issued by the 
Chinese government. They can be seen as very valuable for this research because they 
represent the policies of both states. CDA is applied to these policy papers; however, to gain 
insightful knowledge into the context of both states and understand the macro level of the 
discourse, secondary resources are required.  
Using primary and secondary resources is necessary to develop a complete overview 
of the Netherlands and China as Observer states in the AC, including context. The danger of 
using only sources from the Dutch and Chinese governments is that they present a one-sided 
picture in favor of each state and its contributions as an Observer in the AC. It is therefore 
important to also use both policy documents from the AC and additional scientific research. 
Comparing both states’ actions that are not written in these policies with what is written in the 
policies can clarify whether both states have a hidden agenda to make the most of economic 
benefits. 
Several theories and methods from the abovementioned scholars are being used; 
taking one step further, I engage SD. In order to realize the aims of CDA, a number of 
requirements must be satisfied (Van Dijk 2005, 353). First, CDA focuses on social problems 
and political issues. Second, this critical analysis of social problems needs to be 
multidisciplinary. Third, instead of describing the discourse, CDA aims to explain them in 
terms of social structure. Last, “CDA focuses on the ways discourse structures enact, confirm, 
legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power abuse (dominance) in society” (ibid.). 
Since there is no how-to-do approach, I have compiled my own theoretical framework, which 
is applied to both policy papers of the MFAs.
4
 The first five consecutive steps are followed 
based on Schneider’s list. Schneider is a senior university lecturer at Leiden University and 
has provided a toolbox, (2013b) based on the work of Fairclough and Paul Chilton (2004), for 
conducting a discourse analysis of political texts. Schneider made a list with ten steps for how 
                                                 
3 Blok, Stef. 2019. Kamerbrief actualisering veiligheidsdeel Polaire Strategie translated into English: Letter to Parliament 
updating safety section Polar Strategy. Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. 
4 See Research Method CDA appendix 2. 
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to examine the sources.
5
 These steps are very clear and helpful, ranging from establishing the 
context to presenting one’s findings and everything in between. This means that for the 
current research, policy papers of both MFAs are analyzed so as to investigate the detailed 
functions of the papers and analyze different layers of the texts to make things visible. The 
examined discourse is the role of the Netherlands and China as Observer states in the AC. 
After that, steps six, seven, and eight bridge the gap between the macro and micro level. This 
is where the work of both Foucault and Van Dijk comes in: Whereas language, discourse, 
verbal interaction, and communication belong to the micro level of social order, power and 
dominance belong to the macro level (Van Dijk 2005, 354). The previous step is followed by 
Fairclough’s work and consists of analyzing the three stages of CDA (2001, 21). The first 
stage comprises description of the text, interpretation of the relationship between text and 
interaction, and explanation of the relation between interaction and social context (91). 
Special attention is paid to speech acts and Foucauldian terms such as power, regime of truth, 
resistance, discursive elements, and governmentality. Power relationships are expressed 
through language, identities, practices, and the relationship between knowledge and power. 
After completing each of these steps and interpreting the results, the outcomes are linked to 
SD, and thus soft power, in step nine. This approach helps to explore and understand the 
meaning of the role of the Netherlands and China as Observers, leading to an answer to how 
both states use SD as a strategic tool and potentially revealing hidden agendas in terms of the 
nature of their economic interest. 
As in any other research, there are some limitations. The first problem that I face is 
that CDA can be biased. However, Van Dijk argues that biased scholarship is not inherently 
bad scholarship (2001, 96). The second problem is that CDA does not provide a ready-made, 
how-to-do approach or theoretical framework. Every study needs its own approach, which 
should be tailored to each study (98). In addition, as an academic researcher, one must make 
choices as to what kind of CDA to apply to one’s sources. This means that other levels of 
CDA, and thus other meanings and results, may be excluded in the research. In order to avoid 
excluding important results, I have combined several CDA methods to obtain as complete a 
picture as possible of the situation. The last problem is that the policy paper of the 
Netherlands is in Dutch. This means that I have to translate it into English, which involves 
some subjectivity. In addition, although China published its white paper in English, it was 
probably originally written in Mandarin. Because I do not have any acquaintance with 
                                                 
5 See Ten Steps Schneider 2013b appendix 2. 
  
 20 
Mandarin, I must study it in English. I will never know, at least through my own knowledge, 
what is published in the original paper. In sum, handling sources must be done consciously, 
because it can be slightly subjective. 
 
4. Analysis 
CDA explores the macro and micro levels of a text. To understand macro notions such as 
power and domination, a study at the micro level is required (Van Dijk 2001, 115). In a study 
at the micro level, attention needs to be paid to language, discourse, verbal interaction, and 
communication. First, I take a closer look at both policy papers, including speech acts. As 
mentioned before, speech acts evoke a set of meanings, and exploring the historical context of 
such an act can lead to an ontological shift in thinking (Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso 2018, 
196). This shift can be produced by language use, which is a form of measurement that shapes 
and transforms reality. This critical approach forces us to look at concepts such as mutual 
benefit, win-win, and mutual construction. Both policy papers are discussed at the same time. 
This discussion leads us to suitable information to explore the macro level: the power and 
knowledge relation, including Foucauldian terms. Finally, throughout the analysis, outcomes 
are linked to SD. Given the fact that the Netherlands and China are deeply involved in the 
AC, they could be using SD as a strategy to cover their hidden agenda to accomplish their 
economic incentives. 
 
Speech Acts
6
 
Speech acts evoke a set of meanings and explore the context of such an act. As mentioned, the 
conventions for speech acts, which form part of a discourse type, embody ideological 
representations of subjects and their relationships (Fairclough 2001b, 131). First, I take a 
closer look at China’s speech acts. China’s policy goals are “to understand, protect, develop 
and participate in the governance of the Arctic, so as to safeguard the common interests of all 
countries and the international community in the Arctic, and promote sustainable 
development in the Arctic” (2018, 4). China is improving its knowledge to understand the 
Arctic by conducting scientific research that leads to “favorable conditions for mankind” (5). 
China is responding to climate change, and by doing so, China is protecting the Arctic. 
However, how China’s response to climate change protects this unique environment remains 
unclear. “[C]ommon development” is created by using applied Arctic technology, innovation, 
                                                 
6 2018 between parenthesis is from: The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. 2018. “China’s 
Arctic Policy.”; 2016 between parenthesis is from: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 2016. “Polaire Strategie 2016-2020.” 
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protection, resource utilization, and development of shipping routes (ibid.). Regarding 
China’s participation in the governance, they rely upon the UN Charter, UNCLOS, existing 
treaties, general international law and global, multilateral, and bilateral relations. These goals 
will be accomplished in accordance with “the basic principles of “respect, cooperation, win-
win results, and sustainability”’”(ibid.). The latter statement can be marked as a speech act. 
According to Abuarrah, speech acts come in sequences and carry the speaker’s intention 
directly or indirectly (2016, 200). This is an indirect speech act because this strategy relies on 
the socio-linguistic, political, and legal context of the utterance, which is based on the 
discourse (Ni and Kui 2011, 376). In addition, speech acts are mostly performed in a political 
context, which is definitely the case with China. The word “respect” occurs 23 times and 
“cooperation” 45 times throughout the paper, whereas “win-win” is used 3 times and 
“sustainability” 10 times. These outcomes raise questions about China’s intention in the 
Arctic region: It seems that cooperation and respect are more important than win-win results 
and sustainability to China. 
The Dutch polar policy is based on three key concepts: sustainability, international 
cooperation, and scientific research (2016, 4).
7 “Sustainability” is written 10 times in both 
documentations,
8
 “international cooperation” 12 times; however, the concept is divided in 
two— “international” is mentioned 26 times and “cooperation” 65 times. “Scientific research” 
occurs 12 times. In sum, both states emphasize the significance of cooperation and have 
sustainability in common as a policy goal, and both acknowledge the importance of scientific 
research. Remarkable is that a key notion of China’s is “win-win results,” but it is only 
mentioned three times. In view of this fact, what does China mean with win-win results? 
Implied is, based on liberal thinking, that China is not the only one who is winning. 
According to China, this means “that all stakeholders in this area should pursue mutual 
benefit and common progress in all fields of activity” (2018, 6). Mutual benefit and common 
progress seem quite ambiguous. Although China strives for mutual benefit and common 
progress, this would mean that the benefit needs to be distributed evenly among the 
stakeholders. Another remarkable point is that China presents itself as a stakeholder in this 
area even though it does not have territory in the Arctic region. This leads to another 
remarkable speech act. 
                                                 
7 Translations from Dutch policy papers into English are my own, which might involve some subjectivity. 
8 Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 2016. “Polaire Strategie 2016-2020.” Accessed September 29, 2019; Blok, Stef. 2019. 
“Kamerbrief actualisering veiligheidsdeel Polaire Strategie.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Netherlands: 1-11.  
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The Netherlands see the Arctic region as “global public goods,” and China calls itself 
a “near-Arctic state” (2016, 4; 2018, 3). Dutch policy makers regard the Arctic and Antarctica 
as areas unique to the Earth’s ecosystem, as public, excluding the parts that fall in the 
jurisdiction of the Arctic States. These fragile ecosystems are strongly affected by climate 
change and are therefore not just a matter for neighboring states (2016, 4). China is a near-
Arctic state because it one of the closest continental states to the Arctic Circle (2018, 3). 
China’s argumentation is in line with that of the Dutch: The changes in the Arctic have 
implications for their state. Notions such as “global common” or “near-Arctic state” define an 
implicit structure of its context. China’s justifies its ambitions in the Arctic region by calling 
itself one of the closest states to the Arctic. However, Mongolia and Kazakhstan are 
geographically closer than China. The Netherlands covers its own ambition by calling the 
Arctic region and Antarctica a public common. Both speech acts can be linked to the 
Foucauldian term, regime of truth: China presents itself as one of the closest continental 
states, and the Netherlands regards the Arctic region as global public good. Both countries 
refer to the context that is producing this truth, which is presented as the only truth. Power is 
perpetuated through these notions on a micro level.  
China’s policy paper and its extra documentations contain multiple utterances that can 
be marked as speech acts that evoke a specific meaning. In order to create a structured 
overview, I first explore China’s speech acts, followed by those of the Netherlands. The first 
two paragraphs contain a few remarkable speech acts, such as “shared future for mankind” 
and “champion for the development of a community with a shared future for mankind” (2018, 
2). First, what is the definition of a shared future? One of the biggest challenges today is 
creating a shared vision of a desirable future (Costanza and Kubiszewski 2014, 4). “This 
vision must be a world that we all want, a world that provides permanent prosperity within the 
Earth’s biophysical constraints in a fair and equitable way to all of humanity, to other species, 
and to future generations” (ibid.). China, as a champion, implies with these speech acts that 
they are contributing to a better world. On the other hand, by calling it a shared future, the 
responsibility of the melting of ice and snow in the Arctic is also evenly distributed. Since it 
is a global issue, China does not want to be solely responsible for any further implications. 
Other speech acts, such as “Polar Silk Road” and “blue economic passage,” are also 
noteworthy. Silk is a metaphor, suggesting that items of very high quality and value are being 
traded. The road connects one place to another (Fierke and Antonio-Alfonso 2018, 197). 
China emphasizes that the Belt and Road Initiative is a great opportunity for cooperation and 
encourages parties to jointly build a “blue economic passage” connecting China and Europe 
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via the Arctic Ocean (2018, 11). This passage is called blue due to the ocean and economic to 
accentuate the role of the passage: trade.  
 
China stands for steadily advancing international cooperation on the Arctic. It has 
worked to strengthen such cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative according to 
the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits and 
emphasized policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, 
financial integration, and closer people-to-people ties. Concrete cooperation steps 
include coordinating development strategies with the Arctic States, encouraging joint 
efforts to build a blue economic passage linking China and Europe via the Arctic 
Ocean, enhancing Arctic digital connectivity, and building a global infrastructure 
network. China hopes to work for the common good of all parties and further common 
interests through the Arctic (2018, 11). 
 
A few elements in this quote are remarkable. First, China calls itself a steady partner to 
cooperate with, according to a list of principles. These principles remain quite vague. What 
does China imply with “closer people-to-people ties” or “enhancing Arctic digital 
connectivity” (2018, 11)? Closer people-to-people ties can be traced back to diplomatic 
engagement. Carrying out diplomatic activities and talking to other people is one way of 
getting what one wants. China practices soft power by using diplomatic tools that create 
opportunities and potential global changes. Artic digital connectivity means that data cables 
across the Arctic will be placed to facilitate intercontinental data transfer and improve 
connections for Arctic communities (Arctic Centre of the University of Lapland 2018). These 
connections are crucial, due to harsh conditions in the region, “for the safety of human lives 
and environmental performance, primarily for shipping, tourism, research and resource 
extraction” (ibid.). This digital connectivity contributes to a better global infrastructure as 
well. Nevertheless, China strives for the common good for all parties. In the white paper, 
words such as “jointly promoting,” “shared interests,” “shared benefits,” “same future,” 
“common but differentiated responsibilities,” and “fair and equitable sharing” cannot be 
ignored. These kinds of statements occur in every paragraph. Later on, these above-mentioned 
speech acts will be linked to power and knowledge. 
 The Netherlands also uses speech acts to evoke a set of meanings and explore the 
context of such acts. Moreover, it seems that the Netherlands is hiding behind precaution and 
the EU. The subtitle of the Dutch paper is “together for sustainability” (2016, 1). This speech 
act implies that the Netherlands, just like China, wants to cooperate with other states and 
actors. Noteworthy is that the Netherlands calls upon the EU multiple times. Due to its power 
and resources, the EU can accomplish more than a state. Therefore, the Netherlands formally 
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supports both the EU’s entry as a Permanent Observer in the AC and its involvement in the 
development of Arctic policy. The EU also has authority over policies that apply to the 
Arctic, such as fisheries, transport, the environment, and energy. The Netherlands, as a small 
state, needs an actor who can provide resources and is willing to cooperate. The Netherlands 
is dependent on the EU and is willing to cooperate on issues such as migration, climate 
change, and security. Another example of an eye-catching speech act is “precautionary 
principle and ecosystem approach” (2016, 5). The precautionary principle is used as a guide 
to environmental policy decisions:  
 
Where an activity raises threats of harm to the environment or human health, 
precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships 
are not fully established scientifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, 
rather than the public, bears the burden of proof (Grant and Quiggin 2013, 17). 
 
In other words, if an operation is taking place for which there are strong indications that it 
will harm the environment, measures must be taken even if there is no scientific proof. The 
proponent of this operation will be blamed. The Netherlands appeals to this principle as 
regards the regulation of economic activities in the Arctic region. The problem with the 
precautionary principle is that actors can undertake any operation and take the measures for 
granted. For instance, if the Netherlands wants to engage in certain economic activities in the 
Arctic region, they can do that and accept the measures. If the return is greater than the 
measures, then profits have been made. In addition, the precautionary principle can bring out 
the worst in states or non-state actors.  
The ecosystem approach is the integrated management of human activities, based on 
knowledge of the dynamics of the ecosystem. The aim is both to achieve sustainable use of 
the ecosystem and to preserve the ecosystem’s integrity by identifying and taking action on 
influences critical to the health of the system (2018, 30). This definition of ecosystem 
approach is not clear. It seems that the Netherlands hides behind this principle and approach, 
keeping it as vague as possible so that the country can develop its own economic activities. 
Other striking speech acts in the Dutch policy are “lasting transparent cooperation,” 
“dialogue,” “spillover effects,” “strict environmental and safety standards,” and “legal 
fragmentation.” As with China, the speech acts are linked to power and knowledge. The 
significance of speech acts lies in the fact that China and the Netherlands are justifying their 
own context and its discourse. Both states make ideological representations of the AC and 
their relationship with it.  
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Power and Knowledge 
To clarify how power relations have been perpetuated through the policy papers of the 
Netherlands and China, a closer look at the macro level is necessary. In the following, several 
statements are examined, and these outcomes are linked to the macro context of the 
Netherlands and China. These results are linked to SD. Given the fact that the Netherlands 
and China are deeply involved in the AC, SD can be used as a strategy to cover hidden 
agendas to accomplish economic incentives. 
According to Fairclough, reproduction connects the stages of interpretation and 
explanation (2001b, 135); the stage of explanation connotes seeing a discourse as part of 
process of negotiations and social struggles within “a matrix of power” (ibid.). In terms of 
CDA, the analysis of discourse starts with analyzing the member resources and to develop 
self-consciousness, and awareness of common-sense assumptions. Therefore, the aim is to 
bridge the gap between rational understanding and society, which means making common-
sense assumptions explicit (139).  
 The discourse “the Netherlands in the Arctic region” contains several quotes in which 
power is maintained. The Netherlands is clearly an advocate of cooperation, as evidenced by 
the following quotes, which are more significant than others in light of the fact that CDA aims 
to investigate discourse as the instrument of power and control and as the social construction 
of reality: “more connections with broad international developments and more policy 
involvement is necessary” (4); “binding international standards and agreements” (5); “global 
issues” (9); “The focus in the coming years will be on climate, nature and environmental 
aspects”; “The policy cornerstones are international cooperation, the continuous refinement of 
sustainability criteria and polar research” (10); and “to establish additional international 
agreements” (2016, 27). In addition, it is written in the update that “the Cabinet finds that a 
strong international legal order and active cooperation in relevant forums contribute to 
transparency” (Blok 2019, 7).9 These quotes possess a power-knowledge relation for the 
following reasons. First, The Netherlands appeal to internationally binding agreements and 
cooperation. CDA aims to critically investigate social inequalities. A social inequality is 
embedded here because the Dutch government does not have enough financial resources and 
executing power to make decisions and take action on its own. This means that the Dutch 
                                                 
9 Translations from Dutch policy papers into English are my own, which might involve some subjectivity; 2016 between 
parenthesis is from: Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. 2016. “Polaire Strategie 2016-2020.”; 2019 between parenthesis is 
from Blok, Stef. 2019. “Kamerbrief actualisering veiligheidsdeel Polaire Strategie.”.  
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government needs help from other actors. Second, the Netherlands is a relatively small 
country and therefore relies on international agreements. The Dutch government emphasizes 
the need for cooperation, binding norms, and an international legal order. This cooperation 
contributes to transparency. Power and knowledge are inextricable. The Netherlands do have 
scientific knowledge about the Arctic region; however, to execute power in the AC, they need 
cooperation. It is clear from these quotes that the Netherlands is seeking to strengthen its 
power through international agreements and is calling on other actors to legitimize their 
policy.  
 Regarding China, it seems that China hides behind international agreements and 
therefore may be using SD as a strategy to cover its hidden agenda to accomplish its 
economic incentives. The following quotations are selected to explore power-knowledge 
relations because they possess social inequalities that are embedded in language use. It started 
in 2013, when China presented the “China-EU Strategic Agenda for Cooperation.” China 
wants to “develop joint activities to promote maritime safety and security; share expertise in 
relation to relevant international law; develop exchanges in the Arctic, including joint 
research projects” (The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
2013). Striking about this quote is that China wants to develop activities jointly in accordance 
with the law. In 2017, the Chinese government published three articles in line with the white 
paper on its policy in the Arctic. In these articles, utterances such as “China is an important 
stakeholder […] in accordance with laws”; “Wang called on the international community to 
strengthen environmental protection of the Arctic and continuously deepen scientific 
exploration of the North Pole”; “China is ready to share insights with other countries and 
expand cooperation to create a bright, new future for the Arctic”; and “China has been 
investing ever greater research resources in this regard and has been cooperating well with 
countries along the Arctic coast, which hope to see China play a bigger role in Arctic affairs” 
(2017a). Vice-Premier Wang Yang has said that “China will support the formation of 
advanced scientific research platforms to enhance Arctic scientific research capability […] 
urging the international community to deepen scientific exploration” and “the Chinese 
government encourages enterprises to take part in the construction of the Arctic shipping 
route and step up clean energy cooperation with Arctic countries” (2017b). In addition, Wang 
has said that disputes should be settled in “accordance with international law” (ibid.). Later 
that year, Lin Shanqing, deputy director of the State Oceanic Administration (SOA), noted 
that “China actively honors its international obligations as an observer state of the Arctic 
Council” (2017c). These utterances made their way, if not always in exactly the same words, 
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into China’s white paper. What is striking is that China does not even try to hide its point of 
view behind international agreement.  
In the white paper, “cooperation,” “constructive,” “jointly,” and “in accordance with 
law” and sentences such as “China is an active participant, builder and contributor […] who 
has spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom” (2); “States from outside the Arctic region do 
not have territorial sovereignty […] but they do have rights in respect of scientific research, 
navigation, overflight, fishing […], and rights to resource exploration and exploitation” (2-3); 
“China shoulders the important mission of jointly promoting peace and security in the Arctic” 
(3); “Respect should be reciprocal” (5); “Parties to the Spitsbergen Treaty enjoy the liberty of 
access and entry […] to exercise and practice of scientific research, production and 
commercial activities” (3); “China enjoys the freedom or rights […] as stipulated in treaties 
such as UNCLOS and the Spitsbergen Treaty, and general international law” (3); and “China 
follows international law in the protection of the natural environment and ecosystem” (7). In 
the white paper, China mentions “in accordance with the law or treaties” no less than 16 
times. China relies on UNCLOS, the Spitsbergen Treaty, “general international law,” and the 
UN Charter. In addition, China urges developed countries to fulfill their commitments under 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris 
Agreement (2018, 11). China will help developing countries in tackling climate change. At 
the global level, China plays a constructive role and fulfills its responsibilities in the work of 
the International Maritime Organization (ibid.). Moreover, “UNCLOS does not seem to 
address the issue of outsiders’ abilities to use and exploit unclaimed portions of the Arctic 
because of the loophole-the Convention” (Wodiske 2014, 314). With regard to whatever falls 
outside of these international laws, China does not have to obey these norms and rules. This 
means that China can look for the gray areas in, for instance, resource exploration. Another 
remarkable metaphor is the following: China shoulders. Metaphors have different ideological 
attachments and imply different ways of dealing with things (Fairclough 2001b, 100). When 
shoulders come to mind, they are regarded as strong, supportive, and powerful. China implies 
that they are strong enough to lead the important mission of jointly promoting peace and 
security. The following sentence also contains metaphors; China calls itself an active 
participant, builder, and contributor to justify its ambitions in the Arctic region. This sentence 
does not contain a single shred of humbleness. In addition, China has spared “no efforts to 
contribute its wisdom” (2018, 2). Questionable from this sentence is why China regards itself 
as an active participant, builder, and contributor. It could be the case that China is justifying 
its participation in the AC and giving itself grounds to explore the resources in the Arctic. 
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Another option is that China finds itself more important or better than the other states who are 
involved in Arctic affairs. It is also interesting that the word “wisdom” is used. It seems that 
wisdom is a euphemism used for expressing China’s power. Text producers often realize that 
words as power would constitute a negative evaluation for readers and therefore avoid 
negative values (Fairclough 2001b, 98). That is the reason why a euphemism is used by 
China. 
All these quotations from China possess a power-knowledge relation. China justifies 
its ambition in the Arctic region; however, it does so in accordance with international law, 
based on knowledge created by conducting scientific research in the Arctic region. This 
knowledge generates power, which is a social construct of the reality. This section, CDA on a 
macro level, has taught us that language on the micro level of the discourse is linked to social 
processes on the macro level. The Netherlands relies on other actors such as the EU. China 
does everything according the international law. Both states agree upon the fact that binding 
agreements and cooperation are very important. Power-knowledge relations are expressed 
through social inequalities and language use.  
 As the CDA steps have been completed and the results interpreted, these outcomes are 
linked to SD, and thus soft power, in the following. The above-explained power-knowledge 
relations help to explore and to understand the meaning of the role of the Netherlands and 
China as Observers, which leads to an answer to how both states use SD as a strategic tool, 
potentially revealing hidden agendas in terms of the nature of their economic interests. SD 
combines political agency with the scientific method of knowledge production and is a 
generator of soft power (Copeland 2016, 630). The Netherlands is involved, as mentioned, in 
the following Working Groups: AMAP, CAFF, and SDWG. China participates in AMAP, 
CAFF, and PAME.
10
  
China joined the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1925 and then started exploring the Arctic, 
expanding its scope of activities and gaining more knowledge and experience (The State 
Council Information Office 2018, 4). In 1994, the Snow Dragon/Xue Long was bought to 
boost China’s polar research and expedition capabilities (Pelaudeix 2018, 3). In 1996, China 
joined the International Arctic Science Committee, and in 2004, a research station, Arctic 
Yellow River Station, was built in Norway (ibid.). According to Wodiske, research on climate 
change is important to China to send a clear message to the world it wants to help and has the 
                                                 
10 AMAP: Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program 
CAFF: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna 
PAME: Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment 
SDWG: Sustainable Development Working Group 
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means to do so (2014, 309-310). China is doing research because of its interest in the 
Northern Sea Route because it would provide China with more direct trade routes (308). 
China’s gross domestic product is 46 percent dependent on shipping (ibid.). By the end of 
2017, China had carried out eight scientific expeditions and conducted research for 14 years 
(The State Council Information Office 2018, 4). In 2013, China became a Permanent 
Observer; however, China had applied for this accredited status already in 2009. During their 
application, China’s representatives emphasized that its research activities remained focused 
on environmental impacts. According to Wodiske, China said this to prevent the country from 
not being admitted to the AC because of other AC members’ fear of China as a rising global 
power (2014, 313). Pelaudeix argues that China’s membership in the AC was carefully 
planned through SD (2018, 3). In 2012, a bilateral China-Iceland statement was signed by 
both parties, including a provision of Icelandic support for China’s inclusion in the AC. This 
bilateral relationship has enabled China’s representatives with Arctic scientists to demonstrate 
their awareness of regional development, and Iceland has an economic partnership with China 
(Guschin 2015). Moreover, the Chinese side is represented by five academic centers, and 
China has expanded its embassy staff in Iceland by eight members (ibid.). Other initiatives by 
China are, for instance, China Nordic Arctic Research Center in Shanghai, Aurora 
Observatory, Arctic Circle, and China Remote Sensing Satellite North Polar Ground Station 
in Sweden. In addition, China has signed an agreement with Finland to establish a research 
center for Arctic space observation and data sharing services, and in Greenland, a satellite 
ground station project has been launched, supported by Beijing Normal University (Pelaudeix 
2018, 3-4). From all the abovementioned research examples, it is obvious that China is using 
SD as a strategic tool. China is informing foreign policy objectives with scientific advice, 
there is international science cooperation, and China is improving its international relations. 
SD is a form of soft power, and China is using this form of power. Since the country does not 
have any territory itself in the Arctic, it is exploring the Arctic, including its resources, “in 
accordance with the law” and appealing to UNCLOS. Science collaborations can create 
diplomatic opportunities for China and potential policy changes. 
The Netherlands is using SD as a strategic tool as well; however, their participation in 
the AC Working Groups has different causes. The main goals of the Dutch government are to 
exercise soft power in the Arctic region and to tackle climate change (Tweede Kamer der 
Staten-Generaal 2016, 26). The right to exercise soft power is justified by their participation 
in the three Working Groups. Knowledge of changes in the Arctic region and its impact on 
the Netherlands remain of strategic importance. Therefore, it is important to gain knowledge 
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about the following: the consequences of climate change in the Arctic region and in the 
Netherlands, sea level rise due to ice melting, ocean acidification, increasing human demand 
for natural resources and the potential of accessing them and new shorter shipping routes. 
These are issues that affect the environment and the internationally recognized values of the 
polar regions. Scientific research generates knowledge about the causes of processes that 
occur in the polar regions (NWO 2014, 7). An overall increase in economic growth and 
activity in various forms over the next decade is expected. With this increase in business in 
the Arctic, there is a growing need for knowledge about the Artic and influence in the region. 
Scientific research may then be of interest to the Dutch government and industry. The 
government has a joint responsibility with other countries to implement this knowledge 
within international frameworks (ibid.). The following statements are significant because they 
show that the Netherlands is using SD as a strategic tool: “increasing sharing knowledge in 
the field of environmental impact of projects and programs” (4); “Dutch polar research is 
highly valued internationally” (10); “carrying out clearly visible scientific research” (26); and 
“besides international cooperation, scientific research is an important instrument to achieve 
Dutch policy objectives” (2016, 27). A final quote shows that the Netherlands is deploying 
SD:  
 
The active role that traditionally has been played by the Netherlands in the Arctic has 
been highly appreciated in the global order. This has long been the case for scientific 
cooperation […]. As our security interests in the area increase, there is every reason to 
continue to play this active role in order to reap the benefits (Blok 2019, 10). 
 
In sum, the Dutch government is using SD as a strategic tool. SD has been used to improve 
international and bilateral relations and to be informed about developments in the Arctic 
region. The Dutch government is carrying out visible scientific research in the Working 
Groups to achieve Dutch policy objectives. This leads to the following conclusion regarding 
the participation of the Dutch government in the AC: The Netherlands wants to increase its 
visibility and credibility, be informed about developments, and sustain various relations with 
several stakeholders. In addition, since the ice in the North Pole is going to melt anyway, the 
Netherlands does not want to miss the boat and is therefore creating business opportunities.  
 The Netherlands and China definitely use SD as a strategic tool, but does this reveal 
hidden agendas in terms of the nature of their economic interest? On the one hand, SD is a 
form of soft power, and both states are pursuing their interests. On the other hand, are these 
interests merely economic? With regard to China, it has been clear that they are expanding the 
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network of shipping routes in their favor, which will have a huge impact on the energy 
strategy and economic development of the country. Nonetheless, China is undertaking its 
developments in accordance with various forms of law. For its part, the Netherlands do not 
want to miss out on economic opportunities for Dutch business. However, tackling climate 
change remains their main goal.  
 
Regime of Truth 
Foucault invented the term “regime of truth,” which is one aspect of understanding a power 
relationship. The term refers to context, or the field that is producing this “truth,” which is 
presented as the only truth. Both the Netherlands and China present several truths in their 
policies. The fact that these truths are seen as true might have implications on a global level, 
because powerful people might believe they are actually true. A closer look at indigenous 
people in the Arctic region is interesting because both states included this topic in their 
policies. This topic is part of the construction of a regime of truth because there is a discourse 
around indigenous people that is accepted as truth, but the indigenous community does not 
see it as true. This construction has to do with governmentality. Both states are structuring the 
fields of others, the indigenous people in this case, and are implementing their policies in 
order to exercise power. The Netherlands sees “new opportunities for indigenous people” 
(2016, 24), and China thinks that “Arctic residents, including the indigenous people, will truly 
benefit from the development of Arctic resources” (2018, 11). Both the Netherlands and 
China argue that the indigenous people will benefit from the resources that are becoming 
accessible and that lead to new opportunities. The question that emerges is whether the 
indigenous people actually want these resources. In the AC, six organizations representing 
Arctic indigenous people have the status of Permanent Participants.
11
 As Marsden puts it, 
“Indigenous people must be acknowledged as rights holders rather than stakeholders, and they 
must have a key role in listing, protection and management decisions” (2015, 249). Threats to 
these people are changes in their natural environment and damage to their archaeological 
heritage and their livelihood. However, the advantages of melting in the Arctic for indigenous 
people include discovering cultural heritage, fishing, and mining opportunities (ibid.). The 
president of the Saami Council, Åsa Larsson Blind, noted the following in her speech in 2019:  
 
                                                 
11 See members Arctic Council appendix 1. 
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Three-quarters of the land-based environment and about 66% of the marine 
environment have been significantly altered by human actions, and on average these 
trends have been less severe or avoided in areas held or managed by Indigenous 
Peoples (Blind 2019). 
 
 
The Saami Council is deeply concerned about the development of the Arctic. Blind asks for 
recognition by Arctic States. According one of the findings of World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF), Arctic States do not see indigenous people as equal partners in the management of 
the Arctic region (Blind 2019). The Saami Council is worried about the impact of melting in 
the Arctic, whereas the Netherlands and China see opportunities for these indigenous people. 
This can be seen as a regime of truth, since the indigenous people are mostly worried about 
their environment and not, per se, resources that are becoming accessible. 
 Another set of regimes of truth is interesting to look at. China calls itself an important 
stakeholder, whereas the Netherlands justifies its right to speak and its power by the fact that 
they are one of the most active Observers in the AC (2018, 3; 2016, 24). The discourses 
created by both states are presented as truth. Automatically, alternatives are presented as 
untrue (Bartholomaeus 2016, 911). These truths created by the Netherlands and China are 
presented as common knowledge, and such truths gain and maintain status via institutions 
(914). These ideas are created by certain people and institutions; they create visions of the 
world and are presented as normal. Schneider, based on Foucault, argues that how people 
think about political issues is a continuous negotiation process of what the correct view is 
(Schneider 2013a). These negotiations take place at the discourse level and are manipulated 
and dominated by actors. These negotiations produce and demand a certain kind of legal 
system, and they require certain professions and create social relations (ibid.). This theory, 
linked to “important stakeholder” and “one of the most active Observers” shows that China 
and the Netherlands are creating specific social relations in order to justify their created 
discourse. Since it is presented as common knowledge, people and institutions will believe 
that they are presenting their truths, which in turn exerts power. The above explanation also 
applies to China’s truth, “an important member of the international community” (2018, 4).  
 The Netherlands and China engage in more negotiations on the discourse level. 
Noteworthy are their views on climate change. The Netherlands’ main goal is to tackle 
climate change, and China always gives top priority to resolving global environmental issues. 
In addition, China’s emission reduction has a positive impact on the environment of the 
Arctic. These truths are very questionable. On the one hand, negotiations at the UN climate 
summit in Madrid as Conference of the Parties (COP25) 2019 led to no progress. The Paris 
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Agreement’s target of 1.5 degrees seems not feasible at all due to states who are not willing to 
set strict rules (Keating 2019). The Netherlands and China both signed the Paris Agreement, 
and neither country will achieve the target of 1.5 degrees (ibid.). On the other hand, in the 
case of China, according to Hilton and Kerr, it is possible that China will continue to export 
emissions overseas (2017, 55). This export could be done directly by building coal-fired 
power stations or indirectly by outsourcing heavily energy-industrial production to other parts 
of the world (ibid.). The Dutch government has formed its own National Climate Agreement 
to take measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 49 percent by 2030 compared to 
1990. This goal is not achievable, according to the Netherlands Environmental Assessment 
Agency, a Dutch government body that calculated the agreement. With the current policy, the 
government will not go further than 43 percent to 48 percent (Hofs 2019). China is the largest 
emitter of greenhouse gas, 26 percent of the total amount. In 2018, China increased its 
emissions by 1.9 percent (PBL 2019). Although both countries are trying to tackle climate 
change, the results are marginal. Both states have created a discourse in which they are 
striving for well below two degrees, and they have presented this as a truth, which is accepted 
by many people. However, it is not true, given increasing greenhouse gas emissions. 
The last set of regimes of truth that require special attention is that the Netherlands 
names China several times in its policy paper, whereas China does not name the Netherlands 
at all. “China’s facilities may also be used for military purposes in the future” and “[n]o 
indications that China will deviate from this, but vigilance is also required here” (Blok 2019, 
8). The Dutch government has written no less than four paragraphs about China’s 
involvement in the Arctic in the letter “Updating Safety Section Polar Strategy.” This implies 
a regime of truth. The Netherlands says that although China is not using its facilities for 
military purposes yet, chances are that this will be the case in the future. Since the 
Netherlands has written much about China and is concerned with China’s involvement, the 
Netherlands is framing China as a kind of intruder. The Netherlands negotiates with its 
readers about the current discourse, China in the Arctic, and creates a social relation, which 
exerts power. The Dutch government wants people to believe that China is the “bad guy” who 
wants to make use of resources and minerals. Therefore, the Dutch government is hiding 
behind the concerns of the US about China. During a ministerial meeting of the AC in May 
2019, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the US, Mike Pompeo, expressed his concern about 
China’s development of infrastructure and facilities in the Arctic region (Blok 2019, 7). 
The various discourses regarding, for example, indigenous people in the Arctic; the 
issue of climate change; China calling itself an important stakeholder, whereas the 
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Netherlands justifies its right to speak as one of the most active participants in the AC; and 
the concerns of the Dutch government regarding China’s military purposes, contain regimes 
of truths. Since these truths are presented as true, people and institutions will believe that they 
are presenting the truth, which in turn exerts power. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Climate change caused by human activity is one of the biggest threats to life on Earth at the 
moment and is a salient issue on the policy agenda worldwide. Global warming leads to 
pervasive and irreversible impacts, such as dangerous heat, water scarcity, ocean warming, 
more frequent storms, and hurricanes that are stronger and last longer. One of the major 
challenges is that global warming has accelerated the melting of ice in the Arctic region. Both 
the Netherlands and China have long been involved in Arctic affairs. In 1996, the Ottawa 
Declaration established the AC with eight states, all of which have territory in the Arctic. The 
AC is the leading intergovernmental forum in terms of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic. This forum promotes cooperation, coordination, and 
interaction among the Arctic States, including Arctic indigenous communities. The 
Netherlands became an Observer in 1998, and China joined the AC in 2013. Both states are 
concerned about the impact of climate change in the Arctic region and the different kinds of 
consequences it may have for their state. The Netherlands and China both agree that the 
melting of the Arctic influences economic activities, the geopolitical situation, and 
international relations and that it affects climate, nature, and the environment and its 
biodiversity. Both states contribute to the AC with scientific knowledge, and they participate 
in several Working Groups. The aim of this thesis has been to find out whether the 
Netherlands and China are trying to shift attention away from their own incentives by using 
SD as a strategy. CDA has helped unfold the hidden agendas of both states.  
Given that the Netherlands and China are deeply involved in the AC, SD can 
potentially be used as a strategy to cover their hidden agendas to accomplish their economic 
incentives. China is using SD as a strategic tool: China is informing foreign policy objectives 
with scientific advice, there is international science cooperation, and China is improving its 
international relations. SD is a form of soft power, and China is using this form of power. 
Since it does not have any territory in the Arctic, it is exploring the Arctic, including its 
resources, “in accordance with the law.” Science collaborations can create diplomatic 
opportunities for China and potential policy changes. 
  
 35 
The Dutch government is also using SD as a strategic tool. The government has used 
SD to improve international and bilateral relations and to be informed about developments in 
the Arctic region. It is carrying out visible scientific research in the Working Groups to 
achieve Dutch policy objectives. This leads to the following conclusion regarding the 
participation of the Dutch government in the AC: The Netherlands wants to increase its 
visibility and credibility, be informed about developments, and sustain various relations with 
several stakeholders. In addition, since the ice in the North Pole is going to melt anyway, the 
Netherlands does not want to miss out and therefore creates business opportunities.  
The Netherlands and China definitely use SD as a strategic tool. However, does this 
reveal hidden agendas in terms of the nature of their economic interest? On the one hand, SD 
is a form of soft power, and both states pursue their interests. On the other hand, are these 
interests merely economic? With regard to China, it has clearly been expanding the network 
of shipping routes in its favor, which will have a huge impact on the energy strategy and 
economic development of the country. Nonetheless, China is undertaking its developments in 
accordance with various forms of law. With regard to the Netherlands, it does not want to 
miss out on economic opportunities for Dutch business. CDA has helped to examine various 
statements of both states in their policy papers. It did not unfold hidden agendas of either 
state. It can be said that probably, both states are using SD as a strategic tool to shift attention 
away from their own (economic) incentives. 
Finally, for further research, it would be interesting to apply CDA to the new Dutch 
policy paper on Arctic affairs, which will be published in 2020. Moreover, it would be 
interesting to study the rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the Arctic region. Special 
attention needs to be paid to Russia and China. China’s ambition is to become a polar great 
power, whereas Russia is betting on winning the scramble for resources and territory (Dams 
and Van Schaik 2019, 6-7). 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 – Members Arctic Council12 
 
Member 
States 
Permanent 
Participants 
Observer States Intergovernmental 
and Inter-
Parliamentary 
Organizations 
Non-governmental 
Organizations 
Canada Aleut International 
Association 
France International Council 
for the Exploration of 
the Sea 
Advisory Committee 
on Protection of the 
Sea 
The 
Kingdom of 
Denmark 
Arctic Athabaskan 
Council 
Germany International 
Federation of Red 
Cross & Red Crescent 
Societies 
Arctic Institute of 
North America 
Finland Gwich’in Council 
International 
Italian Republic International Maritime 
Organization 
Association of World 
Reindeer Herders 
Iceland Inuit Circumpolar 
Council 
Japan International Union for 
the Conservation of 
Nature 
Circumpolar 
Conservation Union 
Norway Russian 
Association of 
Indigenous 
Peoples of the 
North 
The Netherlands Nordic Council of 
Ministers 
International Arctic 
Science Committee 
The Russian 
Federation 
Saami Council People’s 
Republic of 
China 
Nordic Environment 
Finance Corporation 
International Arctic 
Social Sciences 
Association 
Sweden  Poland North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Commission 
International Union 
for Circumpolar 
Health 
The United 
States 
 Republic of India OSPAR Commission International Work 
Group for Indigenous 
Affairs 
  Republic of 
Korea 
Standing Committee of 
the Parliamentarians of 
the Arctic Region 
Northern Forum 
  Republic of 
Singapore 
United Nations 
Economic 
Commission for 
Europe 
Oceana 
  Spain United Nations 
Development 
Programme  
University of the 
Arctic 
  Switzerland United Nations 
Environment 
Programme 
World Wide Fund for 
Nature-Global Arctic 
Program 
  United Kingdom World Meteorological 
Organization 
 
   West Nordic Council  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 The Arctic Council. 2015a; The Arctic Council. 2015b.  
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Appendix 2 – Research Method 
 
Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse Analysis in ten steps
13
 
Step 1: Establish context 
Step 2: Explore production process 
Step 3: Prepare material for analysis 
Step 4: Code material 
Step 5: Examine structure of text 
Step 6: Collect and examine discursive statements 
Step 7: Identify cultural references 
Step 8: Identify linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms 
Step 9: Interpret the data 
Step 10: Present findings 
 
Macro vs. micro level
 14
 
1.1 Members-groups 
1.2 Actions-process 
1.3 Context-social structure 
1.4 Personal and social cognition 
 
Three stages of CDA
15
 
2.1 Description 
2.2 Interpretation 
2.3 Explanation 
 
 
Figure 1: Discourse as text, interaction and context
16
 
 
SD and power 
3.1 Linking outcomes to SD 
 
                                                 
13 Schneider, Florian. 2013b. “How to Do a Discourse Analysis.” 
14 Van Dijk, Teun. 2005. “Critical Discourse Analysis.” In The Handbook of Discourse Analysis, p. 354-358. 
15 Fairclough, Norman. 2001b. Language and Power, p. 21. 
16 ibid. 
